undergo a major change in course that led to catastrophic flooding in three provinces, and kept nearly two million acres of good farmland out of dependable production from 1938 until 1947. 3 The flood, as well as the famine conditions and epidemics that resulted from it, created close to four million refugees and killed as many as 900,000 people. Although the Chinese government made attempts to repair the breach, the chaos of war kept this goal out of reach until 1947. Because the river's new course took it through areas unprotected by dikes, those areas experienced flooding and famine conditions not only in 1938, but almost every summer for the next eight years. 4 As a historian of Qing China who spent the past decade immersed in famine texts from the most severe famine in imperial China's history, the North China Famine of 1876-79, the 1938 flood is intriguing to me because it appears to introduce a Chinese state willing to break with the longstanding conviction that the foremost responsibility of a benevolent government is to nourish the people (yangmin) and control the waters (zhishui). The decision to breach dikes for strategic reasons was not new in and of itself. Mark Elvin, for instance, argues that the very technology necessary for constructing the huge embankments that kept the Yellow River in its place originated in part from the walls that combatants in 
CONTROLLING THE WATERS; NOURISHING THE PEOPLE
In ancient and imperial China, controlling China's rivers and feeding the country's large population were key ways for a ruler to demonstrate his moral legitimacy and win the people's hearts.
The Great Yu, for instance, the legendary sage emperor said to be the founder of the Xia Dynasty (roughly 2070 -1600 BCE), demonstrated his fitness to rule by taming China's rivers when others had failed. 10 The account of Yu's deeds recorded in the Classic of History and cited above emphasizes the close connection between managing the rivers, nourishing the people, and gaining political legitimacy.
Once Yu "opened the passages for the streams" and "deepened the channels and canals," the people were able to obtain enough grain to eat, and the different states "began to come under good rule."
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The tradition of holding the state responsible for famine relief and water control, and focusing on the interdependence of human and heavenly roles in disaster causation, was rooted in the Confucian classics.
The Confucian philosopher Mencius (372-289 BCE) insisted that a benevolent ruler could not get away with blaming the starvation of the people on a poor harvest, and was responsible for storing grain during times of plenty and distributing it during times of dearth. Blaming poor harvests for bringing starvation to the people, taught Mencius, was no less wrongheaded than "killing a man by running him through, while saying all the time, 'It is none of my doing. It is the fault of the weapon.'" 12 It was also Mencius who popularized the idea that a ruler's Heaven-granted mandate to rule (tianming) was not immutable, and could be revoked if the ruler strayed from the path of virtue by failing to act with the good of the people at heart. Disasters such as floods and droughts were viewed as warning signs that a dynasty had displeased heaven and was in danger of losing its mandate. This "Heaven-centered mode of political criticism" was elaborated on by the prominent Han dynasty Confucian scholar Dong Zhongshu , 13 and continued to be important into the Qing period . "Rainfall and sunshine were thought to be seasonal or unseasonal, appropriate or excessive, according to whether human behavior was moral or immoral," states Mark Elvin in his essay on moral meteorology in late imperial China. Moreover, "some [individuals] counted for more than others. The emperor's conduct was of preeminent importance; bureaucrats came in second place; and the common people ranked last." 14 The principle that major calamities could not be blamed on nature, but were instead connected to the ruler's conduct, went far beyond the symbolic in terms of both origins and impact, and in fact "shaped expectations of imperial and bureaucratic responsibility" in important ways. 15 "In comparative perspective,"
writes J.R. McNeill, the Chinese state "appears remarkable for its ecological role." In part because China's "intensely anthropogenic landscape" required massive amounts of labor and resources, he continues, there more than elsewhere "the state took primary responsibility for building and maintaining many big waterworks." 16 In terms of the Yellow River in particular, erosion and the deposition of sediment caused the bed of the river to rise above the surrounding plain, so it was necessary to build huge embankments in order to keep the river in its place. 17 Until the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368), notes Randall Dodgen, China's rulers normally pursued a defensive approach that attempted to protect people from the Yellow River by building dikes and diversion channels. The Yuan decision to construct the Grand Canal to link the capital at Beijing to the Yangzi Valley, however, required more complex hydraulic systems. "By binding their strategic wellbeing to Grand Canal transport and Yellow River control," writes Dodgen, "the rulers of the Ming and Qing dynasties . . . linked the symbolic and the pragmatic to an unprecedented degree." 18 The officials in charge of managing the River during its "south-course period" (1194-1855), when the River ran to the sea south of the Shandong peninsula instead of north of it and captured the mouth of the Huai River, constantly battled to control the river. Elvin argues that the scale of the man-made effects that resulted from the herculean efforts these "river tamers" made to control the merged flows of the Yellow and Huai rivers "was probably unequalled anywhere in premodern history."
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The Chinese state's commitment to nourishing the people during times of famine also has a long history. Basic administrative measures to deal with famine were codified in China's first imperial dynasty, the Qin (221-206 BCE), and from the fourteenth century on official treatises on famine relief abound. 20 For both political and cosmological reasons, the Qing state in particular devoted an extraordinary amount of bureaucratic attention and financial resources to both river management and famine relief. 21 The Qing repertoire for retaining the mandate and responding to disasters included both rituals and an impressive array of relief measures. During times of disaster officials and rulers carried out elaborate rituals that aimed to move the heart of Heaven by demonstrating their sincerity and the depth of their concern for the people's distress. As detailed by Jeffrey Snyder-Reinke, when faced with drought, Qing officials were responsible for a wide array of rainmaking rituals. These ranged from prohibiting the slaughter of animals, instituting community-wide fasts, and praying and burning incense at temples, to more extreme measures such as exposing themselves in the hot sun, being chained up, using their own blood to write rain prayers, or threatening or actually committing suicide to demonstrate their willingness to suffer and sacrifice for the people. 22 Concrete relief measures were important as well. As Pierre- with high-Qing disasters include the assumption that it was the state's responsibility to relieve the starving, a strong rhetoric of paternalistic dismay, and an explicit focus on the suffering of famine victims.
Due to the sharp decline caused by massive internal rebellions, fiscal crisis, and imperialist aggression, the late-Qing state proved unable to prevent the severe drought-famine from killing between nine and thirteen million people in five northern provinces. Both Qing officials and commoners agreed that it was the state's duty to provide substantive relief, however, and the beleaguered state made a concerted effort to deal with the calamity. 24 This strong sense of responsibility stemmed in part from the long-established
Chinese practice of attributing the occurrence of famine to an interaction between humans, Heaven, and natural forces rather than to natural disasters alone. 25 Even the famine-era governor of Shanxi Province, the epicenter of the disaster, did not view the terrible drought as the root cause of the famine. "Although the present famine in Shanxi is called a natural disaster (tianzai), in fact it stems from human affairs,"
wrote Governor Zeng Guoquan. 26 Even when Heaven did send down a drought, Qing observers believed 23 Will, 186; Li, 167; Will and Wong, 12-19; 43-57. 24 According to the Shanxi gazetteer compiled after the famine, in Shanxi Province, where the famine was most severe, over 3.4 million people received state relief between 1877 and 1879. The gazetteer reports that government relief offices distributed a total of 10.7 million taels of relief silver and just over 1 million shi of relief grain in the province (Shanxi tongzhi 1892, juan 82, 18b-19a Working at cross purposes from the Qingliu coterie was an influential group of self-strengthening proponents who viewed foreign aggression as a greater threat than the famine, and wanted to limit government spending on relief efforts accordingly. These powerful officials fought hard to dissuade the Qing court from using money allocated for coastal defense to fight the famine. Their focus on the need to purchase weapons and ships stemmed from a series of foreign policy crises in the years preceding the famine, in particular China's humiliating defeat at the hands of the British and French in the Arrow War of 1856-60, the Russian occupation of the rich Ili Valley of Xinjiang in 1871, and the "punitive expedition" that Japan landed on Taiwan in 1874. 33 The self-strengtheners' claim that defending the country from external threats trumped nourishing the people in order to ensure domestic order was quite controversial in the 1870s, but would become more widely accepted during twentieth-century crises.
The Qing Court wavered between the two sides. The Court generally protected self-strengthening projects from Qingliu attacks, but also arranged for a considerable sum of coastal defense money to be diverted to pay for famine relief in Shanxi and Henan. 34 The debates between Qingliu officials and Selfstrengtheners signified a collapse of consensus over how to contextualize a major famine. In late Qing
China, the overall context in which praise and blame were negotiated was gradually shifting from one in "merely a synonym of nature in the sense of the cosmic nature or the natural environment as opposed to culture or human society," writes Chen. 40 It is the third and most narrow Chinese use of tian that most closely corresponds to the strand of modern Western scientific thought that viewed nature as a "simple mechanism entirely accessible to scientific and technical rationalism," and a force that "would no longer be a source of praise or blame, but simply of observation and mastery." 41 Pierre Zaoui, "Fables of Nature," trans. Robert Bononno. In Keywords: Nature, ed. Chen Shao-Ming (New York: Other Press, 2005), 126. There are of course multiple, overlapping and often contradictory Western ideas of nature, some of which approximate the cosmological or political strands in Chinese understandings of tian. It was, however, the largely Anglo-American focus on how to use science and technology to dominate a "new, entirely material nature that was morally and religiously neutral" that most directly impacted China's Republican-era discussions of disaster-causation (Zaoui , 115-126; Buck 1980, 190-191 The rejection of the imperial state's cosmological order was particularly pronounced during the Nanjing Decade (1927-37), which began when the Nationalist Party (Guomindang/KMT) defeated warlord armies and reunified China under Nationalist control. The forceful anti-superstition campaigns launched from within the Nationalist Party during the Nanjing Decade aimed to create a modern nation by "cleansing society of its deleterious aspects and fundamentally reordering it." The campaigns included temple seizures, unpopular attempts to replace the traditional lunar calendar with a solar-based one and to substitute national ceremonies and modern public cemeteries for banned temple festivals and end-of-life rituals, and prohibitions on some ritual specialists and religious groups. 46 In short, like the French and Bolshevik "highmodernist" states examined by James C. Scott in Seeing Like a State, during the decade before the flood, the Nationalist state tried to unify and transform China by replacing the local with the national, and by creating a "new man" shaped by modern science and rationality. 47 The Guomindang's attempt to "create a secular government stripped of rituals linking sovereignty to cosmic authority" proved difficult, however. Nedostup finds that it revealed both the "ultimate poverty of symbolic nationalism" and the limits of secularism. 48 The 1938 flood, as well as the Mao-era Great Leap Famine of 1959-61, suggest that the high-modernist rejection of long-held moral and cosmological interpretations of disaster made it easier for the state to engineer disasters, and harder for leaders to take responsibility for and deal with calamities once they occurred.
A NECESSARY SACRIFICE? THE BREACH AND THE FLOOD, 1938-47
The Yellow River flood of 1938-1947 was a self-inflicted catastrophe of epic proportions. As historian Diana Lary has narrated, nearly a year after the Japanese Imperial Army invaded China in July The decision to breach the dike does not appear to have initiated the kind of controversies among the Nationalist leadership that the famine policy debates of the 1870s gave rise to. "There is no doubt that the decision came directly from Chiang Kai-shek," writes Lary. difficult for the Japanese to transport supplies from north to south. 63 As described by Erleen Christensen, the river itself and the "no man's land" of flooded territory around it created a porous, ever-shifting border between Japanese-occupied territory east of the river's new channel in Henan, and "Free China"
areas on the western side of the river that remained under Nationalist control until Japan's Ichigo When the Yellow River dyke was opened many parts of Sihwa (which is very low-lying) were soon under water; but the water was quite a distance from the city in most directions. Just about five weeks ago, the waters broke through the dyke which protects the city, and in a very short time the city was completely surrounded by water. The fields all round the city area had given promise of a good harvest, but now all are flooded and spoilt. The view from the city wall was a sad one -as far as the eye could see in every direction there was water. The villages being a little higher than the surrounding country, though surrounded by water, it is still possible to live in them. Many of the houses on the outskirts have been washed away . . . .
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The flooding would eventually destroy Xihua. "The city is dead," reported CIM missionaries Louis Gaussen and Henry Guinness in 1946, when they returned to Henan after having been forced to evacuate their stations in the spring of 1944 due to Japan's Ichigo Offensive. "We had a walk round the city wall, and it is a strange sight," they continued. "Outside the waste of dry mud, the silt coming as high as the wall, and inside, four huge ponds in the four corners of the city, running right up to the city main streets, with deserted houses standing in the water." Their journey to Xihua was equally sobering. "We travelled along the dyke of the river. On both sides the land is heavily silted up by the Yellow River floods, so that the houses in many places are silted up to the window sills, or even to the eaves," wrote Gaussen and
Guinness. "Most of the remaining people are living in tiny huts on the dyke, and eking out a living by cutting down trees or tearing down their houses and selling the timber for fuel."
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Missionary accounts also bring home the inexorable nature of the flood, and the fact that many areas that escaped flooding in 1938 were flooded in later years. On July 24 1939, for instance, more than a year after the breach, J.Herbert Kane, a CIM missionary stationed in Fuyang 阜阳, Anhui, wrote to the CIM headquarters in Shanghai to report that he and his wife were planning to evacuate to the mission station in Taihe, which was north of Fuyang and on higher ground, because Fuyang city was in imminent danger of flooding. "Already the water is almost two feet higher than last year's high water mark," he wrote. "This means that a much larger area of North Anhwei is under water than was the case a year ago. Yanling and Weishi 尉氏 counties, villagers told him that more than 700 bandits (tufei) had recently overrun their village, and they had been forced to flee into the shallow floodwaters surrounding the village. The county head had sent forces to drive out the bandits, but they had burned more than 160 houses before they fled. 77 Conditions in Fugou 扶沟 County, just east of Yanling, were "ten times more terrible," continued Guan Sheng in the second part of his report. Eighty percent of the county had been flooded, and both starvation and the spread of infectious diseases (chuanranbing) were driving even farmers who owned a significant amount of land to flee their homeland with their wives and children.
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Disease is also a factor discussed in some detail in the Taihe publications. Malaria and cholera were rampant among flood refugees, stated the editors, and many also suffered from dysentery, smallpox, measles, jaundice, typhoid, scabies and skin ulcers. Yun Jinsheng, who experienced the flood as a child, attributes the spread of diseases among the flood refugees crowded together on dikes or other high ground to the lack of clean drinking water, sanitation, and sufficient food. In his own family his cousin suffered through smallpox, his father and uncle caught typhoid, and both of his grandfathers and four of his younger brothers and sisters perished of various illnesses during the years of flood. 
SACRIFICE AND SCIENCE: WARTIME RHETORIC OF DISASTER
Aware of the radical impact of its actions, the Nationalist government during the war did not admit responsibility for unleashing the flood. Instead, official accounts claimed that the Japanese military had deliberately caused the breach by bombing the Yellow River dike with warplanes in the battle for Zhengzhou. The Japanese government and military, however, vehemently denied that charge. 84 The international press was also skeptical of the Chinese claim almost from the beginning, largely because the flood was so obviously a boon to the Chinese army. China's major newspapers, on the contrary, strongly supported the Chinese government's explanation of the breach in the flurry of articles they printed about the flood over the summer of 1938.
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Some publications directly engaged Japan's denial of responsibility. In the past Yellow River floods had always been natural disasters (tianzai), asserted the leading Shanghai-based journal Dongfang Zazhi roughly six weeks after the breach, but this time the calamity was caused by Japanese bombings. The Japanese had used all possible means to "subjugate our nation and exterminate our race," charged the journal, but none defied human reason as much as their use of the Yellow River. Yet rather than admit 84 87 Although leading provincial newspapers in the flood-stricken provinces continued to publish articles about the flood throughout the war, in-depth coverage of the disaster in national newspapers largely petered out in the fall of 1938, when attention shifted to the increasingly grim war news from the Yangzi valley region. It resumed in 1946, when the Nationalists and Communists began to fight over how and when to repair the dike and return the Yellow River to its original course. their guilt, the Japanese were actually reporting that the Chinese themselves had destroyed the dike. "We believe and hope this kind of false accusation won't mislead the world," it concluded. 88 Even in the freewheeling atmosphere of Wuhan in 1938, where under the newly-formed Guomindang-Communist united front government no one party or warlord was able to exert strict control over the Chinese press, 89 newspapers from across the political spectrum upheld the government's account.
Even the Communist-launched Xinhua Ribao (New China Daily) the only Communist-run newspaper to be openly published in Guomindang-controlled territory during the war, blamed the Japanese for the flood.
"The southern dike of the Yellow River was breached by the barbarous enemy, resulting in water flowing out and flooding southwards," reported the newspaper on June 12, 1938. 90 It was not until 1946, well after the Japanese defeat, that the Xinhua Ribao first accused the Nationalists of breaching the dike.
The relatively pro-Guomindang Dagongbao (The impartial), which historian Stephen MacKinnon identifies as "probably the leading daily in the country" in the 1930s, never took that step. 91 After directly blaming the Japanese for the breach over the summer of 1938, the paper gradually dropped all attempts to explain how the breach had occurred, and simply used the passive voice whenever it mentioned the genesis of the flood. 92 Most likely a patriotic unwillingness to criticize the government in the heat of war, coupled with a desire to use the flood to mobilize people against the Japanese, best explains the Chinese media's decision not to question the rapidly discredited government account.
Media reports about the flood also suggest an intriguing shift in the language of sacrifice. In the 1870s the intense suffering experienced by famished commoners --and the urgent need to relieve that suffering --took center stage in coverage of the famine. It was officials who were expected to sacrifice on behalf of their starving "children" by weeping, fasting, exposing themselves in the sun for hours, or even threatening suicide to move the heart of Heaven. In contrast, during the Yellow River flood it was the extent to which flood refugees themselves were laying down their lives for the country, as well as the need to redeem that sacrifice, that caught the attention of the Chinese press. China's wartime media gave relatively little attention to the misery experienced by flood refugees. National newspapers were most interested in blaming Japan for the breach, celebrating the difficulties the flood caused for Japanese troops, charting the progress of the flood waters, detailing the Chinese government's attempts to repair the breach, and using the example of the flood victims to inspire readers to resist the Japanese. They proved as willing as Chiang's military command to paper over actions that brought widespread suffering to civilians, as long as those actions contributed to national survival. "We should say, it is for the nation that the disaster victims in eastern Henan endure suffering. Their sacrifice (xisheng) is a sacrifice borne for the nation," pronounced the Xinhua Ribao in June 1938. A month later it printed a letter titled "If we can save one more compatriot affected by the disaster, we will add a little more power to resist the enemy."
The letter asked city residents in Wuhan to donate a full day's wages to the flood relief effort. "Brothers and sisters," wrote the committee in charge of the donation campaign, "these donations are not only a work of charity, but also a way of enhancing our power to resist the enemy and build a new state."
93
The Chinese media's focus on sacrifice was to some extent shaped by the Nationalist government's wartime rhetoric. Like many other leaders in power during World War II, Chiang Kai-shek constantly urged the Chinese people to sacrifice for the war effort. "After six years of sacrifices and bloodshed we should seize upon this most crucial period, redouble our efforts and intensify our struggle before we can reap the rewards for our sacrifices and console the spirits of our martyrs," he said in the message he delivered to the nation in July 1943 to mark the sixth anniversary of the Japanese invasion.
Chiang urged "the armed forces and civilians of the nation" to strengthen their will to resist and fight the refugee compatriots experienced ten times or a hundred times our suffering (kunan), so we must quickly arise to relieve these refugee compatriots in order to bring about the survival and happiness of the entire Chinese nation," counseled Guan Sheng after his tour through the flooded counties in eastern Henan.
Young men from the inundated area should be encouraged to join the army and fight against the Japanese invaders, he suggested, and the government should organize cultivating teams that would send refugees to reclaim land and foster agricultural production in Shaanxi, Gansu, and Qinghai. Some of Guan Sheng's descriptions of flood refugees awaiting relief in also appear decidedly distancing:
The disaster victims, having experienced the flood, were sunburned to the black-yellow color of African slaves. Upon hearing that someone would go there to investigate the disaster and give out relief, they all squatted beside the water, eyes fixed into the distance hopelessly, waiting. When we arrived at the village and got out of the boat, it made me imagine the mood of the very moment when Columbus discovered the New World." 
THE TECHNOLOGIZATION OF DISASTER
Rather than calling on policy makers to "examine and blame themselves" and demonstrate a willingness to change course in order to move the heart of Heaven, as was expected of officials in the 1870s, during the war with Japan the Chinese press and government often looked to modern technology and international aid to bring the flood disaster to an end. 98 The proposals put forward in a 1943 Henan Minguo Ribao editorial on ways to eliminate Yellow River disasters once and for all, for instance, revolved mainly around technology. Stones were crucial for constructing sound dikes, reasoned the journalist, so "in order to facilitate the transport of stones, after dikes on both sides are repaired, we will 96 Henan Minguo Ribao, July 22, 1943. 97 Ibid., September 2, 1943. 98 Ironically, sophisticated understandings of river engineering were important not only during the postwar campaign to repair the dike, but also during the frantic attempts to breach it. Wei Rulin's account of the breach offers a detailed overview of five key reasons why the two attempts to breach the dike at Zhaokou were unsuccessful, and credits the "successful" outcome at Huayuankou in part to the lessons learned from those two failures (Minguo Dang'an 1997: 13-14).
build a railway on them." This railroad, while built especially for transporting stones, "can also be used for national defense needs." 99 A second editorial provides an example of "high-modernist" faith in scientific and technical progress and mastery of nature that, as Scott has demonstrated, is often a hallmark of state-initiated disasters, particularly when combined with a weak civil society and an authoritarian state that repudiates the past and uses emergency conditions to push forward its attempts to reorder society and nature. 100 "When the war ends the government will return to the discussion of relief and will put into effect fundamental plans to control the river and make it return to its original course. It will use scientific methods to eliminate flood danger permanently, and will ask the United Nations for relief assistance,"
wrote the journalist. 101 The editorial also highlights the Guomindang's willingness to solicit foreign aid, an attitude not shared by their late-Qing or Mao-era counterparts.
Drawing on modern technology and international aid also became a major focus in the Nationalist "The breach plugging work in Huayuankou is a very great project, because the breach is 1,460 feet wide," stated the author of a lengthy editorial from July 1946. Plugging it thus entailed building temporary bridges on either side of the breach, digging diversion canals for the excess water, and gradually filling in the breach with tons of stones. The correspondent described the bridge stakes shipped in from the United States, as well as the electric generators, machine workshop, pumps, giant cranes, and excavators scattered all over the work site, and noted that, "standing beside these machines, we felt quite ignorant."
Since the project began on March 1, he continued, "with the help of international friends and owing to the hard labor of tens of thousands of workers," a thousand feet of the western dike had already been built.
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A Dagongbao report about the goals of a group of consultants sent to study the Yellow River in January 1947 highlights the ambitious engineering goals of the post-war Nationalist state. The delegation, reported the newspaper, aimed not only to bring the River under control, but to "permanently solve the historic problems caused by the River so as to bring peace to the people and life to North China."
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As the negotiations between the Communists and the Nationalists reached a stalemate in January, 1947, the Dagongbao printed a lengthy Guomindang government press report which explained, in very technical terms, why closing the breach could not be delayed for five more months as the CCP representatives had proposed. According to the government's publicity department spokesperson, Peng
Xuepei, the breach must be plugged immediately, while the water level was not too high and the flow capacity was only about 1000 meters (gongchi) per second. After early February, ice would begin to melt and giant chunks of ice would break the new dike. Even if the dike could withstand the ice, it would never last through the high-water periods that began in late March, when the flow capacity would be 4000 meters per second, and peaked in late July, when the flow capacity could be 30,000 meters per second.
The breach needed to be plugged between October and January, he concluded, making a five-month delay counterproductive. Concerning the CCP's claim that closing the breach immediately would harm those people living in the old riverbed, continued Peng, they had all known that the river would one day be returned to its previous course, so they had not built permanent houses. Moreover, those forced to move would receive compensation. 108 This press release, filled with precise measurements and technical information, provides a telling example of the Nationalist government's technologization of disaster.
MOBILIZE THE MASSES: CCP USES OF THE FLOOD DURING THE CIVIL WAR
The Chinese Communists, in contrast, depicted the breach itself, as well as the Guomindang's plan to repair it quickly, as prime examples of Nationalist China as a failed state. As soon as the UNRRA and Chinese-government led effort to plug the breach began in March of 1946, the Communist-run Xinhua Ribao began to argue that the old riverbed and its dikes must be repaired before the breach could be closed, and that villages living in and alongside the river's old course must receive compensation. 109 Then in May 1946, roughly nine months after Japan's defeat, the paper finally broke with the official narrative and directly accused the Guomindang of having breached the dike in the first place. The paper printed an overview of a Communist Party spokesman's claim that the Guomindang had dispatched troops to breach the dike at Huayuankou in 1938 in order to prevent the enemy's invasion, and that because the Nationalists had kept the plan a secret, the number of compatriots (tongbao) who had lost their lives and possessions could not be counted. 110 The CCP's rhetoric escalated rapidly after its initial accusation. Using water in place of soldiers was "an idea too outdated for modern wars," charged the Xinhua Ribao, and pointed out that the flood had failed to save even Wuhan from the Japanese. 111 By January 1947, when the Communist-versusNationalist struggle over plugging the breach was most intense, the communists had developed a broader argument about the Yellow River breach. In contrast to Guomindang accounts and reports in the Dagongbao and the Shenbao, the Xinhua Ribao mentioned foreign assistance and technology only tangentially. 112 The newspaper's primary postwar focus was instead the human suffering caused by the Throughout this editorial the Xinhua Ribao contrasted the CCP's policies, which it claimed were all enacted "to safeguard the people's interests," with the Guomindang's lack of basic concern for the people's welfare. It concluded by claiming that the real reason the Guomindang authorities were in such a hurry to close the breach was they thought it would help them defeat the CCP. "They don't realize that the Chinese Communists depend on the power of the people, not geographical conditions," stated the journalist; "they are destined to fail." 116 The Nationalists succeeded in closing the breach on March 15, 1947 in spite of Communist opposition. The Yellow River began flowing back into its original course in full the following day. 117 That May, on the anniversary of the May 4 th Movement, the Nationalist government held a "lavish ceremony" at Huayuankou to celebrate its success. Chiang Kai-shek gave a speech commending the workers and officials who closed the breach and remembering those workers who died at their posts during the project. 118 Communist representatives were not present at the ceremony, but within two short years of the ceremony they were in control of the country, while Chiang and many of the officials he commended had fled to Taiwan. Upon taking power, the Communists quickly adopted many of the Nationalists' modernizing goals, among them controlling and harnessing the Yellow River.
CONCLUSION
The Yellow River flood of 1938 provides an instructive mid-way point between late-Qing and Maoist responses to and coverage of major catastrophes. Some aspects of the disaster --in particular the focus on saving the nation-state even at the cost of widespread and intense human suffering, the militarization of the language of disaster relief, and the muted descriptions of the victims of the catastrophe --mark a sharp departure from late-imperial responses, but foreshadow in interesting ways features of the Great Leap
Famine of 1959-61, which killed roughly 30 million people. 119 Unlike the North China Famine but like the even more devastating Great Leap disaster, the 1938 flood was directly precipitated by the policy decisions of the Chinese government. Like the PRC government during the Great Leap, in 1938 the Nationalist government refused to take responsibility for the disaster it had created. Yet akin to their Qing predecessors and quite distinct from PRC leaders, the Guomindang admitted the extent of the disaster, allowed media coverage of it, and sought non-governmental donations and foreign assistance to bolster the limited amount of relief the state could provide.
Wartime media coverage of the Yellow River flood demonstrates how nationalist sentiments, inflamed by Japanese brutality, were used to justify and even sacralize the suffering of flood refugees.
Moreover, the "technologization" of disaster shifted focus away from the moral, cosmological, and political dimensions of calamity, thus enabling leaders to sidestep culpability for disasters to a degree that would have been impossible for their Qing predecessors. In a sense, the government's very willingness to create such a catastrophe by breaching the Yellow River dike in the first place highlights the extent to which the self-strengtheners' once controversial claim --that defending China from invaders trumped relieving the misery caused by famines or floods --had gained general acceptance by the 1930s.
During the Chinese civil war, the Guomindang's focus on modern technology and foreign assistance proved to be less appealing to many Chinese than the Communist emphasis on "safeguarding the people's interests" and harnessing their power. This can be explained in part by the fact that the CCP's focus on human suffering over technology, and on the power of the Chinese masses rather than international assistance, resonated with and drew power from much older, Confucian/Qingliu understandings of a benevolent government as a government that both protects and depends upon the people for its survival.
The fact that the Chinese Communists envisioned a more active role for "the people" than their late-Qing or Nationalist counterparts may also have had a certain appeal. Late imperial rhetoric of disaster expected . people in stricken areas to remain loyal to the state as long as it provided relief, but it was primarily officials and rulers who were called to both practical and ritual action during a major calamity. During the Yellow River flood Chinese newspapers occasionally called on young male flood refugees to enter the military to fight against Japan, but for the most part flood refugees were depicted as admirable but largely passive sufferers. For the Chinese Communists, on the other hand, mobilizing, as well as feeding the rural masses was crucial. According to Maoist ideology, writes Lillian Li, unequal distribution of wealth rather than technological backwardness was the root cause of poverty, so awakening class consciousness and harnessing the power of the peasantry was seen as the surest route to a strong new China. 120 Hence the Party's contempt for the Guomindang's decision to use flooding instead of "the power of the masses" to defend China from
invaders. Yet only a decade after denouncing the Guomindang for ignoring the people's interests by causing the flood, the Maoist state would mobilize China's rural population on such a massive scale and in such a coercive manner that the country would undergo the most lethal famine in both Chinese and world history.
The valorization of sacrificing one's life or well-being for the nation that ran throughout discussions of the Yellow River flood, as well as the rejection of the long-held belief that disasters were Heaven's way of warning those in leadership positions to examine their actions and change course, helps to contextualize state responses (or lack thereof) to both catastrophes.
